I am Assistant Professor in Philosophy at Durham University. My work stretches across philosophy of psychology and social epistemology, and interacts with issues in philosophy of psychiatry, medicine, law and education. My recent research focuses on stereotyping, implicit bias, epistemic injustice, and distorted memories.
Before arriving in Durham, I studied for my PhD at the University of Sheffield, had a postdoc position on the ERC-funded Project PERFECT in Birmingham, and held teaching positions at the University of Bristol and University of Glasgow.
You can contact me by email at email@example.com.
Forthcoming. “Credibility Deficits, Memory Errors and the Criminal Trial”. Truth and Trials: Dilemmas at the Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Law edited by Zachery Hoskins and Jon Robson.
2020. “Epistemic Injustice and Implicit Bias”. An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind edited by Erin Beeghly and Alex Madva (with J. Holroyd)
2019. “Stereotyping Patients“. Journal of Social Philosophy.
2019. “Disclosure of mental health: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives“. Philosophy, Psychology and Psychiatry.
2019. “Human memory and the limits of technology in education”. Educational Theory (with C. O’Donnell).
2019. “Philosophy, bias and stigma”. Why Philosophy? edited by Diego Bubbio & Jeff Malpass (with L. Bortolotti).
2019. “Implicit bias and prejudice”. Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology edited by Miranda Fricker, Peter J. Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Pedersen, and Jeremy Wyatt (with J. Holroyd).
2018. “Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs”. Philosophical Studies (with L. Bortolotti).
2017. “Stereotyping: The multifactorial view“. Philosophical Topics, 45, 1, 137-156.
2017. “Dissolving the ethical/epistemic dilemma over implicit bias”. Philosophical Explorations 20: sup1, 73-93.
2017. “Epistemic Discrimination”. Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Discrimination edited by Kasper Lippert Rasmussen.
2016. “Accessibilism and the challenge from implicit bias”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97, 3, 421–434
2014. “A defence of epistemic responsibility: why laziness and ignorance are bad after all”. Synthese 191, 14, 3297-3309.